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“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence.”1
Introduction
Three police officers have just pulled up to a man’s house and knocked
on the front door. They tell him that they believe that he might be the
victim of online identity theft; his personal information, bank accounts,
social security number, and every other piece of his private life may now be
in the hands of a total stranger.2 If so, this stranger now has the power to
assume his identity, drain his bank accounts, max out his credit cards, or do
anything else he wants under an assumed alias.3 The police tell the man
that they can check his computer to determine whether or not he is the
victim of this frightening crime, but they need his permission first. How
should he respond? The last thing he wants is someone absconding with his
identity, so he says, “Yes, my computer is right this way.” The prospect of
all his personal information in the hands of a stranger is terrifying and he
now feels that he needs all the help he can get. He also trusts the police.
After all, their mission is to protect and serve and they did say that they
were here to help him. But what if this is not the case? What if the police
are not here to help him at all? What if there really is no solid indication
that he was the victim of identity theft?
In reality, the police merely want him to give them permission to
search his computer because they think it contains illegal images of child
pornography.4 They do not have enough evidence of this to obtain a valid
warrant to search the computer, but his permission to search is just as
good.5 And now he has just given them permission to search his computer
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
2. See generally Saul Hansell, Visa Starts Password Service to Fight Online Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at C1 (reporting that roughly 94% of Visa credit card holders are
vulnerable to online credit card fraud schemes).
3. See e.g., Scott J. Wilson, THE FIVE; Preventing Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2011, at B3 (reporting that identity thieves can use stolen personal information to access
financial accounts, open credit cards, or even rent properties under an assumed alias).
4. See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1903, 1905 (1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of criminal
investigation . . . .”); see also e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 308 (1990) (discussing
the use of deceptive tactics by police as a means to obtain confessions from suspects).
5. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a
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under the mistaken assumption that they are here to help him combat the
potential theft of his precious identity.6 The police then search the
computer under his grant of permission, but they make no concerted effort
to search for evidence of identity theft. Rather, they begin scanning image
files, carefully looking for images of child pornography. Soon thereafter,
the police have seized his computer, arrested him, and charged him with the
illegal possession of child pornography. All of this resulting from his
consent to search, given under the pretext that the police were looking for
evidence of identity theft; that they were there to help him. But this was
just a lie, a means to gain access to his computer, access that they otherwise
did not have.
At its core, this Note is about the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .”7 Specifically, this Note addresses the validity of consent in
several unique cases in which uniformed police officers employed the use
of a ruse to gain a suspect’s consent to search. These cases, similar to the
scenario discussed above, raise an extremely poignant and difficult set of
questions pertaining to protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.8
There is undoubtedly a need for officers of the law to ferret out and
prosecute crimes, particularly those as heinous as child pornography. But
there is an equally powerful need to preserve the rights afforded to all
citizens by the Constitution. It is striking a balance between these two that
proves especially difficult.9 As a society, we have accepted, and the courts
have upheld, the necessity for police officers to sometimes lie in the pursuit
of crime.10 For example, undercover officers lie on an almost continual
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”); see also
infra note 37 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Fourth Amendment requires
law enforcement to show probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant).
6. See discussion infra Part I.A (examining consent to search as one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See id. (providing protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).
9. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1956 (“The reason for many of [the doctrine of
criminal procedure’s] complications may be that the doctrine aims simultaneously to achieve
two very different goals: controlling the behavior of police and prosecutors, and facilitating
the central mission of the criminal process—the separation of the innocent from the
guilty.”).
10. See, e.g., Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609–11 (1895) (acknowledging
that the government is entitled to the use of undercover agents in pursuing crime); see also
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1966) (acknowledging the necessity for
undercover police activity).
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basis in order to maintain their cover while building a case against the
criminals with which they are in contact.11 The criminals have no idea that
they are being deceived by the police, but courts have held that this is not a
violation of their constitutional rights.12 In fact, such deceptive actions are
a necessary and effective method for fighting crime. Without such latitude,
citizens could be subjected to all the various ills that crime produces.13 As
such, all law-abiding citizens count on the government to provide some
measure of protection against crime. In turn, these citizens place a great
deal of trust in their law enforcement officers. But what happens when this
trust is abused, even in the pursuit of legitimate criminals that pose a
distinct danger to society? Where do we draw the line between the
permissible use of deception by law enforcement officers to gain consent
and that which goes beyond what can and should be allowed?14
Assuming that it is even possible to create such a bright line in the
obscure realm of police deception, arriving at an appropriate answer is not
easy. Since the inception of the Fourth Amendment, many exceptions have
been drawn to its rule.15 Inevitably, its waters have been muddied in an
effort to strike an elusive balance between protecting citizens’ rights and
prosecuting crime. There does seem to be a difference between, for
example, an undercover police officer lying to a potential criminal and a
police officer lying to a citizen by saying that he has a warrant to search his
house, when in fact he does not.16 In the first instance, the suspect has no
11. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 208–09 (“Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the
decisions of this court . . . that, in the detection of many types of crime, the Government is
entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.”).
12. See id. at 207 (1966) (concluding that the deceptions of an undercover narcotics
officer were not constitutionally prohibited).
13. See, e.g., Rachel Ehrenfeld, Perspective on the Drug War: Whither Columbia,
America?; Trafficking and Money-Laundering Stretch from Streets to Banks to Government.
And We’re Losing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at M5 (reporting that international drug
trafficking and money-laundering has a devastating impact on American society).
14. See, e.g., Megan M. Rector, The Maryland Survey: 2003–2004, Recent Decisions:
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 64 MD. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2005) (arguing that by
allowing police deception in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, courts have left
citizens vulnerable to arbitrary invasions of their privacy).
15. See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 28–32
(2009) (examining and detailing the inception and evolution of various Fourth Amendment
exceptions).
16. Compare Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966) (concluding that the
deceptions of an undercover narcotics officer were not constitutionally prohibited), with
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (stating that a blatant misrepresentation
made by uniformed officers is essentially a form of coercion).
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idea that the undercover officer is actually a police officer.17 Typically, the
suspect intends to engage in some sort of criminal activity with the
undercover officer.18 The suspect does not know that the undercover agent
is an officer, and therefore he does not expect the certain level of trust that
often accompanies police officers.19 However, this is not the case in the
latter instance when the officer clearly identifies himself to the suspect as
an officer of the law. This person now has a certain level of trust towards
the officer, whose primary duty is to protect and serve the citizens in his
jurisdiction.20 Thus, within the scope of these two different scenarios, one
form of lie is accepted, while the other is not.21 Courts and society both
seem to generally accept this, providing two concrete guidelines for
permissible police deception.22 But this still leaves an immense grey area in
between which includes the hypothetical scenario discussed above.
This Note explores a portion of that grey area through the lens of
several similar cases that fall squarely within its bounds.23 Each case
involves police officers telling suspected possessors of child pornography

17. See, e.g., Lewis, 385 U.S. at 207 (noting that the undercover officer identified
himself to the defendant by an alias, and not as an officer of the law).
18. See id. (noting that an undercover officer went to the defendant’s house with the
express purpose of purchasing marijuana, an illegal act).
19. See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 455, 472 (1999) (stating, as an example, that judges operate under a principle that
police officers are presumptively trustworthy).
20. See id. at 462 (stating that the foundation of public trust in the government rests on
the responsibility of public officials to make fair representations); see also White v. Beasley,
453 Mich. 308, 331, 552 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1996) (“The public-duty doctrine begins with the
premise that police officers owe a duty to the public to investigate crime and to protect the
citizenry because they are police officers.”).
21. Compare Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (stating that a blatant misrepresentation is
essentially a form of coercion), with Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609–11 (1895)
(acknowledging that the government is entitled to the use of deceit by undercover agents in
pursuing crime).
22. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court allows police to use deception to gather
evidence and urge confessions).
23. See United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 724–25 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the
defendant’s computer because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); see
also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (granting defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s computer because
defendant’s consent to search was invalid); People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87, 100 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009) (concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was
warranted because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
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that they believed that they were victims of online identity theft.24
However, the officers never mentioned that they in fact wanted access to
the suspects’ computers in order to search them for images of child
pornography.25 Thus, the police used the specter of identity theft to gain
consent to search these computers.26 In all three cases, the police found
illegal images of child pornography on the suspects’ computers and they
were subsequently arrested.27 Were these suspects’ Fourth Amendment
rights violated? It is a straightforward question, but there is no immediately
clear answer.28 Each of these suspects was in possession of illegal
material,29 but each of these suspects was also told a lie in order to obtain
consent to search.30 The lie was not a complete fallacy, such as claiming to
have a search warrant when in reality one does not exist,31 but the
statements were not strictly truthful either.32 Thus, they fall squarely
between truth and fiction, placing two directly competing issues at odds
here. We can allow “little white lies” like these under the justification that
they are a necessary means to discover and prosecute criminals, but we
would do so at the expense of fostering trust between law enforcement
officers and citizens. On the other hand, we can prevent the use of such
deceptions in order to stop the development of such a void of trust.

24. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
see also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 594 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (explaining
misrepresentations made to defendant regarding identity theft); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (discussing use of identity theft as a ruse to gain access
to defendant’s computer).
25. See Prinzing, 907 N.E. 2d at 108 (explaining police’s use of a ruse to gain access
to child pornography files).
26. See id. (explaining the deception used to gain defendant’s consent).
27. See id. (outlining events leading to Prinzing’s arrest); see also Richardson, 583
F.Supp. 2d at 707 (detailing Richardson’s eventual arrest); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 601
(explaining circumstances surrounding Parson’s arrest).
28. See generally Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (detailing the Fourth Amendment
analysis); Prinzing, 907 N.E. 2d 87 (detailing the Fourth Amendment analysis); Richardson,
583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (detailing the Fourth Amendment analysis).
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing challenges of Fourth
Amendment analysis).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a
patent misrepresentation made by law enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the
suspect’s consent to search rendered the following search unconstitutional).
32. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
see also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing,
907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
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However, the downside is obvious: police officers would be restricted in
their ability to pursue legitimate criminals.
Part I of this Note briefly examines and outlines the relevancy of the
Fourth Amendment to consent searches, since this document provides the
ultimate backdrop for searches and seizures of citizens’ property. Part I.A
examines consent to search as one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. This Part outlines the necessary requirements for consent to
be valid and the standards that courts use as a tool to analyze the validity of
a suspect’s consent. Part I.A.1 examines the scope of consent and the new
guidelines that come into play in order to determine the constitutional
parameters of a consented search. Part I.B briefly outlines the concept and
requirements of the plain view doctrine, another exception to the warrant
requirement. Thus, the entirety of Part I provides the background law
necessary for analyzing the validity of a suspect’s consensual search. Part
II contains the three main cases that this Note focuses on. This Part
provides the necessary facts and the analytical processes each court used to
ultimately arrive at a conclusion that police illegally obtained evidence of
child pornography. This Part also provides some personal analysis of each
court’s approach to the issue at hand. Part III examines the potential
applicability of the plain view exception to each case, ultimately concluding
that the facts of each case are such that the exception does not apply. Part
IV of the Note offers the suggested rule that when police officers are
operating as fully disclosed officers of the law, they must state the main
purpose of their visit to a suspect’s home in order to validly obtain any
consent to search without a warrant. This Part discusses and analyzes this
proposed rule, ultimately concluding that it is necessary not only to
maintain a semblance of trust between citizens and police officers, but also
to provide firm guidance to police in the efforts to investigate potential
crimes. Finally, Part V concludes the Note.
The issue discussed in this Note is so immensely complex because it is
nearly impossible to draw a bright line between police deceptions that
violate the Fourth Amendment and those that do not.33 The various Fourth
Amendment exceptions that have been drawn by courts have served to
carve away at the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment, but they
have not done away with it altogether.34 The Fourth Amendment still
33. See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (refusing to hold that
the use of deception by law enforcement agents is per se unconstitutional).
34. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this Court,
however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number
and carefully delineated’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
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provides citizens with substantial protections from invasive searches and
seizures.
I. The Fourth Amendment as It Relates to Consent to Search Absent a
Warrant
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”35 The Fourth Amendment protects
one of the most fundamental rights in American history—the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.36 It requires all officers of
the law to obtain a search warrant, issued only upon a showing of probable
cause, before searching a citizen’s home.37 Note, however, that certain
exceptions to this rule do exist.38 Throughout American history, courts
have vigorously upheld this right in an attempt to protect all citizens from
police abuse during searches.39 Such judicial protections are essential to
maintaining the validity and reverence of the Fourth Amendment in
American society.40 These protections encompass a variety of settings,
including a citizen’s body, movable property, and home.41 Of particular
relevance to this Note are searches conducted within a citizen’s home, a

(1972))).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend IV. (“No warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.”).
38. See infra Part I.A (discussing consent to search); see also infra Part I.B (discussing
the plain view doctrine).
39. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of
Thermovision imaging to explore areas of the home normally unreachable without physical
intrusion is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 222–23 (1981) (concluding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s home
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment protections).
40. See e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 218 (1986) (“Since the landmark
decision in Katz v. United States, the Court has fulfilled its duty to protect Fourth
Amendment rights . . . .”).
41. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment provides personal protections from unreasonable searches in a number of
different settings).
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place that has commanded great reverence in American judicial history.42
“‘At the very core ‘of the Fourth Amendment’ stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’”43 With only a limited number of exceptions, a
warrantless search of a citizen’s home is unreasonable, and therefore
unconstitutional.44 Absent this handful of special circumstances, the
Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld this principle,
essentially requiring all searches to be conducted pursuant to a validly
obtained warrant.45 Thus, it is firmly established that the Supreme Court
considers a search conducted pursuant to a validly obtained warrant as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, once one departs from
this principle, the judicially established boundaries of reasonableness
rapidly deteriorate.
Several exceptions exist that allow law enforcement officers to
conduct a search absent a warrant.46 However, the Supreme Court has
noted that these exceptions are relatively few in number and carefully
delineated.47 Furthermore, the Court has been relatively hesitant in finding
the existence of such exceptions that allow for a circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment.48 These warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable unless the government can show the existence of one of these
exceptions.49 Based on the importance of the Fourth Amendment, it is no
42. See id. (“In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded
by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its
roots in clear and specific constitutional terms . . . .”); see also Christine Hurt, Regulation
Through Criminalization: Of Breaches of the Peace, Home Invasions, and Securities Fraud,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2007) (“The cultural importance of home and hearth is
well-established and embodied in the oft-repeated phrase ‘a man’s home is his castle.’”).
43. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
44. See id. (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”).
45. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (“Except in such special
situations, we have consistently held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or make
an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.”).
46. See MCINNIS, supra note 15, at 28–32 (outlining several exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement).
47. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this Court,
however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number
and carefully delineated’. . . .” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972))).
48. See id. at 749–50 (noting the Supreme Court’s hesitation to find the existence of
exigent circumstances that would allow for a warrantless search of a citizen’s home).
49. See id. at 750 (“Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the
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surprise that the Supreme Court has been wary of creating judicial
exceptions to the warrant requirement.50 It is also not surprising that there
is a relatively high burden on the government to prove the existence of an
exception to the rule.51 For purposes of this Note, two exceptions are
particularly relevant: consent and the plain view doctrine.
A. Consent to Search in the Absence of a Warrant
“A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made
lawful by what it brings to light. . . .”52
The Supreme Court has firmly established that one of the
specific exceptions to the requirement of a warrant is a search
conducted pursuant to a citizen’s consent. 53 Validly obtained consent
renders a warrantless search reasonable. 54 But this exception is not
taken lightly, as the Supreme Court stated that valid consent is a
“jealously and carefully drawn” exception to the rule prohibiting
warrantless searches. 55 As a result, several pivotal Supreme Court
cases have carefully established what constitutes valid consent to a
warrantless search. 56 Perhaps most important, a citizen’s consent to
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”).
50. See id. at 749 (“Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that
exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated’. . . .”
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972))).
51. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (stating that the burden
of proof rests on the government to prove that law enforcement officers validly obtained a
suspect’s consent to search).
52. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
53. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
54. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (citing Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth
Amendment requirements . . . .”).
55. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (noting the care and diligence
that the Court has used in carving out this exception (quoting Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 499 (1958))).
56. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223 (stating that the voluntariness of consent is
to be determined from a totality of the circumstances); see also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting relevant factors in determining whether a suspect
voluntarily gave consent to search).
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search must be voluntarily given. 57 Voluntariness of consent is a
factor that should be examined under a totality of all the
circumstances. 58 Such circumstances can include the suspect’s age,
gender, race, and level of education. 59 Additionally, great weight
should be placed on the widely shared societal expectations in
assessing the voluntary nature of a suspect’s consent.60 Many lower
courts have acknowledged this by placing a high importance on
society’s values and expectations, concluding that voluntariness of
consent is examined under these societal notions of fairness.61 In
analyzing these issues of valid consent, two competing concerns
come into play: the legitimate need for police searches and the need
to ensure the absence of police coercion in obtaining consent. 62 In
balancing these concerns, the Court established a test in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, stating that consent is invalid if it is coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force and is not
a product of free and unconstrained choice. 63 Thus, any amount of
coercion used in obtaining consent will render the following search
unconstitutional.64 As the Supreme Court bluntly stated in Bumper v.
North Carolina, “[w]here there is coercion there cannot be
consent.” 65 But this raises another issue: what actions constitute
coercion?
Determining what constitutes coercive action is sometimes very
easy. The application of force, an overwhelming show of force, the
57. See MCINNIS, supra note 15, at 99 (stating that consent to a search must be
voluntary).
58. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248–49 (“[V]oluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances . . . .”).
59. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (noting that these factors are relevant, but not
decisive, in evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent).
60. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to
widely shared social expectations . . . .”).
61. See People v. Daugherty, 514 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting that
voluntariness of consent is viewed in light of society’s notions of fairness).
62. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]wo competing
concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion.”).
63. See id. at 228 (“But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent
not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.”).
64. See id. (noting that even subtle coercion renders the resulting consent void).
65. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
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brandishing of weapons, intimidating movements, and other such
threats are all clear examples of easily identifiable acts of coercion.66
Furthermore, certain misrepresentations used by police officers to
obtain consent can constitute coercion. 67 For example, in Bumper v.
North Carolina, the Supreme Court stated that material
misrepresentations made by police rendered consent invalid. 68 In
Bumper, police falsely stated that they had a warrant to search the
suspect’s house. 69 As a result, the suspect’s grandmother consented
to the search under the assumption that she had no choice. 70 Thus,
the Court has established that such blatantly false statements are akin
to coercion. 71 Professor LaFave, a renowned criminal procedure
scholar, echoed this notion by stating that when a misrepresentation
is so extreme that it deprives an individual of his ability to accurately
assess the situation in order to determine the potential need to
surrender, then consent is not valid. 72 Thus, it is firmly established
that consent predicated upon blatantly false statements is not valid.
But, the picture is not so clear when it comes to lesser deceptions
made by the police.
In Lewis v. United States, 73 the Supreme Court refused to craft a
per se rule about the use of deception by law enforcement officers. 74
The Court stated that such a rule would severely hamper the
66. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002) (listing a variety of
behaviors that constitute easily identifiable acts of coercion).
67. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (holding that a patent misrepresentation made by law
enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s consent to search rendered the
following search unconstitutional).
68. See id. (noting that the officers’ false claim of having a search warrant is tinged
with coercion).
69. See id. at 546 (noting that the prosecution did not try to justify the validity of the
search by arguing the validity of the warrant since none existed).
70. See id. at 547 (describing the grandmother’s belief that the officers had lawful
authority to search the house since they claimed to have a search warrant).
71. See id. at 550 (noting that when a law enforcement officer claims he has the
authority of a warrant to search a home, he is essentially stating that the suspect has no right
to resist).
72. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (stating that consent
is not valid if it is given in response to an extreme misrepresentation made by law
enforcement officers).
73. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966) (holding defendant’s consent
to search valid, thus validating the use of deception by undercover police officers).
74. See id. at 210 (refusing to hold that the use of deception by law enforcement
agents is per se unconstitutional).
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government’s efforts to pursue organized criminal activity. 75 Instead,
the Court stated that in this particular area, courts must examine each
case based on its own particular facts and circumstances. 76 However,
the Court was careful to note that “[w]ithout question, the home is
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections.”77 Thus, a
distinct grey area of the law exists when a police officer’s
misrepresentations fall short of the blatantly misleading category. 78
Lower courts are left simply with an analysis framework based within
the vagaries of societal notions of fairness and good faith. 79 In turn,
this presents a tough balancing act that courts must follow between
weighing the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens against the need
for law enforcement to zealously ferret out criminal activity. 80 It is
undisputed that valid consent must be freely and voluntarily given, 81
but it is decidedly unclear what degree of falsehood is necessary to
constitute outright coercion. However, the Court has established that
the government must prove that consent was freely and voluntarily
given in order to uphold the constitutionality of a warrantless
search. 82 But, if a citizen does consent to a search, additional
limitations exist that serve to narrow the permissible parameters of
the search.

75. See id. (“Such a rule would, for example, severely hamper the Government in
ferreting out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings
with victims who either cannot or do not protest.”).
76. See id. at 212 (“[I]n this area, each case must be judged on its own particular
facts.”).
77. Id. at 211.
78. See Rebecca Strauss, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of
Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 882 (2002) (arguing that police
deception should negate any resulting consent to search).
79. See e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (noting that great
significance should be placed on widely shared societal expectations of fairness in assessing
a suspect’s consent).
80. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]wo competing
concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion.”).
81. See PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 269–70 (2005) (noting that an individual whose property
is to be searched must give consent freely and voluntarily).
82. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (“When a prosecutor
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”).
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1. Scope of the Search Once Consent Is Granted

Once a citizen does consent to a search, an entirely new set of
guidelines comes into play to determine the scope of the search.83 Courts
apply these guidelines in order to determine the exact nature and extent of
the search to which the citizen consented.84 As a result, anything found
outside the scope of the search is inadmissible as evidence.85 In United
States v. Ross, the Supreme Court stated that the scope of a warrantless
search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which the
object might reasonably be found.86 As an example, the Court notes that
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in
a van does not justify a search of a suitcase inside the van.87 Additionally,
the Supreme Court stated in Maryland v. Garrison that limiting searches to
specific areas in which it would be reasonable to find certain objects
prevents the type of wide-ranging, exploratory searches that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to prohibit.88 However, determining the scope of a
warrantless consent search can become problematic because there is no
warrant listing the specific areas that the officers have probable cause to
search.
In an effort to provide some guidance, the Supreme Court stated in
Florida v. Jimeno that “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood
83. See HUBBART, supra note 81, at 274 (explaining how to determine the scope of a
suspect’s consent).
84. See id. (explaining how to apply judicial guidelines in determining the scope of a
search).
85. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) (stating that seizure of
evidence discovered as a result of a search that exceeds its permissible scope is
unconstitutional, and therefore the seized evidence will be excluded).
86. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless
search . . . is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.”).
87. See id. (listing several examples of reasonable places in which police officers
might find specific types of objects).
88. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (describing the limitations and
tailoring of searches to their legitimate justifications). The Court continued:
By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which
there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the
wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.
Id.
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by the exchange “between the officer and the suspect?”89 Accordingly
courts should not apply a subjective test analyzed in respect to a suspect’s
unique, individual characteristics. Rather, courts should administer a test
under an objective standard based upon what a typical, reasonable person
would have understood the consent to entail.90 Lower courts have applied
the objective standard outlined in Jimeno in a variety of cases, focusing
primarily on the exchange between the police officer and the suspect.91
Thus, an examination of the exchange between the suspect and the police
officer is essential to determining the scope of the consented search and any
limitations that might be placed thereon. As Professor LaFave notes, a
search conducted pursuant to consent cannot be more intensive than what
the suspect contemplated in giving his consent.92 As a result, the test for
the scope of consent is an objective, factually intensive analysis that focuses
largely on the exchange between the suspect and officer. However, there is
an exception to the scope requirements.
B. Plain View Doctrine as an Exception to the Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court has established that police officers may seize
evidence found in plain view without a warrant.93 Over time, the Court has
honed and developed a fairly specific test to offer firm guidance in
analyzing plain view issues.94 This test is specifically laid out in Horton v.
California.95 In Horton, the Court stated three prerequisites that a police
89. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 183–89 (1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983)).
90. See id. (stating that courts should use an objective standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect’s consent).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 1999) (Baldock,
J., concurring) (focusing on what a reasonable person would have understood the search
scope to entail based on his exchange with the police officer); see also United States v.
Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the standard for measuring scope is that
of objective reasonableness).
92. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.2 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter TREATISE ON FOURTH AMENDMENT] (“[T]he
fundamental point here is that a search pursuant to consent may not be more intensive than
was contemplated by the giving of the consent . . . .”).
93. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant.”).
94. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (outlining and developing this
test).
95. See id. at 136 (concluding that officers constitutionally seized evidence under the
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officer must satisfy before a seizure will be deemed constitutional under the
plain view doctrine.96 First, the officer must be lawfully present at the place
where the evidence can be plainly viewed.97 This simply means that the
search or seizure that put the officer in a position to observe the object is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.98 However, if the initial intrusion
is unreasonable, then the officer is not in a valid position to make the
observation and the evidence will be suppressed.99 To meet the second
requirement, the officer must have a lawful right of access to the
evidence.100 As a result, the officer must be able to seize the evidence
without an additional intrusion.101 Finally, the third element requires that
the incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately
apparent.102 The Supreme Court stated that the proper standard to
determine this is the probable cause standard.103 Thus, if these three above
mentioned requirements are satisfied, then any evidence that an officer
discovers outside the initial scope of the search may still be admissible
under the doctrine. This doctrine establishes that the mere observation of
an object in plain view is not a search and its main function is to permit the
warrantless seizure of an object under the above criteria.104 The basic
rationale for the doctrine is that if an officer lawfully observes an object left
in plain view, then there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of
plain view doctrine).
96. See id. at 136–37 (outlining a three-part test for the plain view doctrine).
97. See id. at 136 (“It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless
seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.”).
98. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION § 7.4.4.4.1 (2008) (describing the nature of the “prior valid intrusion”
requirement).
99. See id. (“If the initial intrusion is unreasonable, then the police are not validly in a
position to make the observations and the evidence will be suppressed.”).
100. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (“Second, not only must the
officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she
must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”).
101. See CLANCY, supra note 98, at § 7.4.4.4.2 (“The plain view doctrine differs from
mere visual inspection from a lawful vantage point in that the officer is also in a lawful
position to seize the object without an additional intrusion.” (emphasis in original)).
102. See Horton, 496 U.S at 136 (“First, not only must the item be in plain view; its
incriminating character must also be ‘immediately apparent.’”).
103. See CLANCY, supra note 98, at § 7.4.4.4.3 (noting the probable cause standard for
determining the incriminating character of an object as embraced by the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)).
104. See id. § 7.4.4.4 (noting that observation of an object in plain view is not a search
and that the doctrine permits the seizure of such an object).
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privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment.105 Thus, the plain view
doctrine serves as a legitimate exception to warrant requirement under the
Fourth Amendment.106
II. The Cases—Grappling With the Problem of Police Deception and
Consent to Search
The previously mentioned framework for analyzing warrantless
consent searches seems straightforward enough, but this is hardly the case
when one must attempt to apply these doctrines to real cases. The
seemingly bright line rules soon become blurred as courts are forced to sort
out the constitutional issues that inevitably arise in the pursuit of crime.107
The following three cases are prime examples of this, and a brief
examination of each will illustrate just how difficult these constitutional
issues are.
A. United States v. Richardson
In United States v. Richardson,108 the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania squarely addressed the issue of
whether the defendant’s consent to search was involuntary due to law
enforcements officers’ misrepresentations to the defendant that he was a
victim of identity theft.109 Ultimately, the court granted Richardson’s
motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his computer,
105. See id. (outlining the rationale of the plain view doctrine according to modern
jurisprudence (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993))).
106. See WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 20 (3d ed.
2010) (stating that the plain view doctrine is “a legitimate exception to the warrant
requirement for the reason that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable seizures as
surely as it proscribes unreasonable searches”).
107. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (“There are cases in which it is
plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact
there is such a right.”).
108. See United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 724–25 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the
defendant’s computer because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
109. See id. at 707 (stating the main issues presented by Richardson were the
voluntariness and scope of his consent to a search of his computer); see also United States v.
Montoya, 760 F.Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“It seems clear that when the officers do not
have at least reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in crime, there can be no
justification for resorting to false statements to get into a dwelling.”).
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stating that while Richardson’s consent was voluntary, the search exceeded
the scope of that consent.110 The facts of this case are relatively similar to
the other cases that follow, but there are some subtle differences that
undoubtedly affect the analysis of the defendants’ consent under the
aforementioned framework.111 In Richardson, local police received a tip
from federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents that
Richardson had unsuccessfully attempted to access an illegal child
pornography website on several occasions.112 Several local police officers
then proceeded to Richardson’s residence, where they told Richardson that
they wished to speak to him regarding some illegal credit card activity over
the Internet.113 It is important to note that none of the officers believed that
there was enough probable cause to obtain a search warrant.114 Based on
this, the court commented that, “[t]he only purpose of the agents referring
to the fact that someone had improperly used Defendant’s credit card was to
secure his cooperation. . . .”115 Thus, the court determined that the officers
inferred that Richardson might have been the victim of some sort of identity
theft.116 None of the officers indicated that they were investigating the
possibility that Richardson was in possession of child pornography,
although this was clearly their main intent.117 After this initial discussion
about possible illegal online credit card activity, the officers asked
Richardson if they could search his computers and he consented.118 A
110. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 723–25 (granting Richardson’s motion to
suppress because the police search exceeded the scope of Richardson’s voluntary consent).
111. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (outlining the requirements necessary for valid consent
and the plain view doctrine)
112. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 696−97 (stating that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agents discovered that someone matching Richardson’s name, physical
address, email address, and credit card number had tried to access an illegal website on
several occasions).
113. See id. at 698 (quoting the officer’s testimony stating that he told Richardson that
they were there regarding some illegal credit card activity over the Internet).
114. See id. (stating that the officer did not apply for a search warrant prior to visiting
Richardson’s house because he did not believe enough probable cause existed); see also
Investigations and Police Practices, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 89 (2009)
(stating that police officers can conduct a constitutional search absent a warrant or probable
cause based upon an individual’s consent).
115. United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 699 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
116. See id. at 700 (noting the repeated inferences made by officers throughout their
visit to Richardson that he may be the victim of identity theft).
117. See id. (noting that although it was the officers’ intent to investigate the potential
possession of child pornography, they did not indicate that this was their purpose for the
visit).
118. See id. (noting that the officers asked Richardson for consent to search his
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subsequent search of the computer’s hard drive revealed numerous images
of child pornography.119 Richardson subsequently made a motion to
suppress this evidence.120
The court began its analysis by initially addressing the issue of the
voluntariness of Richardson’s consent.121 The court relied on its
earlier conclusion of law in United States v. Richardson (“Richardson
I”),122 stating that Richardson’s consent was voluntarily given.123 The
court subsequently concluded that the voluntariness of Richardson’s
consent was the law of the case.124 The court determined that the
officers’ initial statements to Richardson that they were investigating
potential illegal credit card activity were not lies or
misrepresentations.125 Instead, these statements were a possible
explanation for the attempted access to the illegal child pornography
Internet sites.126 Thus, due to the absence of any misrepresentation, the

computers and that he consented both orally and in writing); see also United States v.
Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 18
(9th Cir. 1973)) (stating that a consensual search is unreasonable if obtained by trickery or
deceit).
119. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 703–04 (noting that the officers found
numerous images of suspected child pornography after searching the computer’s hard drive).
120. See id. at 696 (stating that the court will address Richardson’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure).
121. See id. at 707 (addressing the issue of the voluntariness of Richardson’s consent as
addressed in previous rulings of law); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22
(1967) (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)) (noting that validly obtained
consent to a search renders a search reasonable).
122. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 726 (conditionally granting part of Defendant’s
motion to suppress).
123. See id. at 710 (stating that the earlier conclusions of law discuss the manner in
which Richardson voluntarily gave officers consent to search his computers).
124. See id. (“The voluntariness of Defendant’s consent for the agents to enter his home
and search his computers is thus the law of the case.”); see also United States v. Tibbs, 49
F.Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968)) (noting that consent must be "freely and voluntarily given").
125. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 710 (stating that the officers’ vague
explanations to Richardson for the purpose of their visit was not a lie or other type of
misrepresentation).
But see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 807 (1997) (noting that when
undercover officers assume an active role in pursuing criminals, their actions can constitute a
significant invasion of privacy).
126. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 710 (stating that credit fraud was a potential
explanation for how someone else may have attempted to access the child pornography
websites).

186

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 167 (2011)

court determined that Richardson voluntarily gave the officers consent
to search his computers for signs of credit fraud.127
This is arguably the correct conclusion, but it is far from
definitive. Technically, the officers did not lie to Richardson since
they were actually investigating potential illegal online credit card
activity,128 but they clearly led Richardson to believe that they were
investigating one matter—credit card fraud—when they were truly
investigating another—possession of child pornography.129 Other than
the mere possibility that someone else used Richardson’s information
to attempt to access illegal websites, there really was no legitimate
indication that Richardson was the subject of credit card fraud.130 Yet,
the officers focused their conversation with Richardson solely on this
remotely plausible theory.131 However, the officers never actually lied
to Richardson by keeping the subject of their conversation with him
As a result, no concrete and obvious
intentionally vague.132
misrepresentation coerced Richardson to consent to a search.133
However, the nature of the exchange between Richardson and the
police did affect the court’s analysis of the scope of the search.134
In analyzing the scope of Richardson’s consent, the court properly
relied upon the objective reasonableness standard outlined in Florida
v. Jimeno.135 Thus, the court focused heavily on the verbal exchange
127. See id. (“In the absence of any misrepresentation, the consent obtained by [the
officers] was voluntary.”).
128. See United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States
v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974)) (stating that an entry premised upon a
complete lie is not justified by consent).
129. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 719 (noting that the agent’s vague statements
about credit card fraud led Richardson to believe that he was not suspected of possessing
child pornography).
130. See id. at 697 (noting the lower court’s finding of fact that there was not much
information indicating an attempt by someone other than the Defendant to access the illegal
websites).
131. See id. at 719 (stating that the officers “presented the Defendant with a concern of
the presence of a crime concerning his credit card being used on the Internet”).
132. See id. at 710 (stating that the officers’ vague explanations to Richardson
regarding the purpose of their visit was not a lie or other type of misrepresentation).
133. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (noting that the officers’ false
claim of having a search warrant is tinged with coercion).
134. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 712–13 (using the framework outlined in
Jimeno to examine the nature of the exchange between Richardson and the officers).
135. See id. at 711 (quoting the language of Jimeno outlining the reasonableness
standard).
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that took place between Richardson and the officers, particularly
noting the absence of any discussion related to child pornography. 136
The main subject matter of the discussion revolved around illegal
credit card usage and the inferred possibility of identity theft, thus
leading Richardson to believe that he was a possible victim, not a
suspect.137 As such, any voluntary consent given by Richardson
applies only to the subject matter of his exchange with the officers as it
was reasonably understood by all parties.138 The key here is that
although “illegal credit card activity” is a broad category, the officers
led Richardson to believe that he was the victim of some sort of credit
card fraud.139 Thus, a search for image files on the computer was
outside the areas of the computer that would be useful in identifying
possible identity theft.140 As the court aptly notes, “[i]f there is no
meeting of the minds on the subject matter of the search [between the
officer and the suspect], the consent to search cannot be found to
authorize a search for any subject matter because the Defendant
objectively lacks understanding of what the Government is seeking.”141
Thus, the officers’ vague description of “illegal credit card activity”
coupled with the inferences of identity theft provided a restriction on
the scope of Richardson’s consent.142
136. See id. at 710–11 (noting that there was no initial discussion of child pornography
between Richardson and the officers).
137. See id. at 712 (noting that the context of the exchange between Richardson and the
officers led Richardson to believe that he might be a victim of identity theft, not a possible
suspect in a child pornography investigation); see also Jeffrey Haningan Kuras et al.,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130, 1176 (2002) (“The scope of consent
is determined by asking how a reasonable person would have understood the conversation
between the officer and the suspect or third party when consent was given.”).
138. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 711 (noting that the absence of any mention of
child pornography limited a reasonable understanding of the search limits to only that of
material related to potential identity theft).
139. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Panel Discussion: The Present and Future Fourth
Amendment, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 119 (1995) [hereinafter Present and Future Fourth
Amendment] (examining the legal morass surrounding pretextual stops in which an officer
claims to detain a citizen for some innocuous reason when in reality the officer is searching
for evidence of illegal activity).
140. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 712 (“With the subject matter of the
conversation revolving around illegal credit card usage and Internet activity, a search for
images was far afield from the subject matter of what Web sites the computers were used to
access.”).
141. Id. at 714; see also United States v. Tibbs, 49 F.Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1999)
(noting that a court’s examination of a consent to search requires careful scrutiny).
142. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 713 (noting that the vague description the
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This is clearly the proper conclusion. The court was correct in
finding that the officers led Richardson to reasonably believe that
evidence of credit card fraud was the object of their search.143 Perhaps
if the officers had not led Richardson to believe that he was a victim of
some sort of online scheme, then their search might not have been so
narrowly limited. “Illegal credit card activity” is a broad and vague
category with many possible understandings. The officers did not tell
Richardson a blatant lie, since accessing and making credit charges to
child pornography sites is illegal.144
The officers were truly
investigating illegal credit card activity on the Internet,145 but they
subtly led Richardson to believe that child pornography was not the
focus of their investigation.146 As one officer testified, “[i]n some
definitions for a ruse—I may have used a ruse in the initiation of the
interview.”147 Thus, the officers relied upon an incomplete truth to
gain Richardson’s consent to search. Such incomplete truths can be
just as misleading as a blatant lie, and, if the officers had employed the
use of a blatant lie, the evidence would have been suppressed without a
second thought.148 Here the court properly rejected the use of such a
ruse as a means to gain sweeping consent to search the entirety of
Richardson’s computer, ultimately limiting the search’s scope to that
which directly relates to online credit card fraud.149
B. United States v. Parson
officers gave for their visit resulted in an unintended restriction of what the objectively
reasonable scope of the search could be).
143. See id. at 719 (stating that the officers presented Richardson with the possibility
that his credit card was used illegally on the Internet, thus leading him to believe that this
was the object of the search to which he consented).
144. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (2009) (outlawing the possession or distribution of child
pornography).
145. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 719 (stating that the officers presented
Richardson with the possibility that his credit card was used illegally on the Internet).
146. See id. at 712 (noting that the subject of the conversation revolved around illegal
credit card use on the Internet, and not images of child pornography).
147. See id. at 701 (quoting Special Agent Lieb who testified that the officers did not
clearly describe to Richardson the type of illegal activity for which they were searching).
148. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (stating that a blatant
misrepresentation is essentially a form of coercion).
149. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 713 (noting that the vague description the
officers gave for their visit resulted in an unintended restriction of what the objectively
reasonable scope of the search could be).
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In United States v. Parson,150 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania again addressed the issue of whether the
defendant’s consent to search was involuntary due to law enforcement
officers’ misrepresentations to the defendant that he was a victim of identity
theft.151 In answering this question, the court properly examined the totality of
the circumstances involved, including the defendant’s characteristics and the
exchange that took place between him and police officers.152 The court noted
that the defendant, Parson, was sixty-five years old, living in a trailer,
supporting himself on Social Security benefits totaling less than $1,000 per
month, hard of hearing, afflicted by cataracts, and taking medication for
depression.153 The court noted that these characteristics are particularly
pertinent towards analyzing the voluntariness of Parson’s consent.154 As a
result, the court was decidedly subjective; they took into account all of
Parson’s unique personal aspects in an attempt to analyze his current state at
the time of the police search.155 This appears to be perfectly within the
parameters for determining voluntariness as outlined by previous case law.156
The presence of these various characteristics undoubtedly placed Parsons in a
vulnerable position and the court specifically noted this.157 The court also
stated that the presence of three agents, all inside Parson’s small trailer, served
150. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (granting
the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s
computer because the defendant’s consent to the search was invalid).
151. See id. at 594 (“The foremost issue is whether Parson’s consent to search was
involuntary due to law enforcement’s misrepresentations to Parson that he was a victim of
identity theft.”).
152. See id. at 602 (stating that assessment of the circumstances surrounding Parson’s
consent includes analyzing “the characteristics of the accused” and the details of his
exchange with the police); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)
(noting that voluntariness of consent should be determined from a totality of the
circumstances).
153. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 597 (explaining Parson’s personal characteristics
and current living situation).
154. See id. at 602 (noting that Parson’s physical condition is relevant in analyzing the
voluntariness of his consent).
155. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1263, 1280–84 (1985) (“The criteria of voluntariness affect the legal significance of acts in
every branch of the legal system”).
156. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that factors
such as age, gender, race, etc. are relevant to an analysis of the voluntariness of a suspect’s
consent).
157. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 607 (noting that Parson’s advanced age, poor
physical and mental condition, and current living situation left him in a particularly
vulnerable state).
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as an intimidating force; a force that was further amplified by Parson’s
vulnerable position.158 Parson even testified: “I was afraid to refuse doing
anything they asked because [sic] there’s three men there.”159
Thus, it is clear that before even addressing the use of police
misrepresentations, the court envisioned a scenario in which a partially
disabled old man was intimidated by three officers in his tiny trailer. From the
findings of fact stated by the court, this does not seem to be an absurd or
illogical conclusion.160 Undoubtedly, Parson’s vulnerable nature had a distinct
impact on the nature of his interaction with the officers.161 In turn, this
presumably had some influence on the court, perhaps to the point where it
may have found that Parson’s consent was involuntary based solely on the
intimidating environment present at the time.162 Nevertheless, the court
rightly included an analysis of the effect that the officer’s misrepresentations
may have had in influencing Parson’s consent to search.163
The police officers initiated the conversation with Parson by stating
that they were investigating potential identity theft involving Parson’s
credit card.164 However, the lead investigating officer testified that
although there was always the chance that Parson was actually the victim of
identity theft, the reality of this was remote.165 This testimony, coupled
with the lack of any evidence suggesting that Parson was an identity theft
victim, strongly influenced the court to conclude that the officers did not

158. See id. (explaining the intimidating effect of the agents on the Defendant). The
court continued:
In this matter, three agents entered the small trailer of a sixty-five-year-old man.
Speaking from the likely perspective of a public citizen, two agents seem to
constitute a necessary and proper investigative team; however, three agents
seem an intimidating force.
Id. See also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 785 (2005) (“[C]onsent to
search is ‘voluntary’ if the police have not used ‘coercive’ tactics in obtaining the consent.”).
159. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 607.
160. See id. (noting the overall vulnerability of Parson’s condition).
161. See id. (quoting Parson’s testimony in which he states that he felt intimidated by
the officers).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 602 (beginning the court’s analysis of the officers’ misrepresentations).
164. See id. at 597 (noting that one of the officers present during the search of Parson’s
home testified that one of the other officers told Parson that they were there investigate the
possible identity theft involving Parson’s credit card).
165. See id. at 596 (noting that the lead investigator did not believe there was a high
probability that Parson was the victim of identity theft).

A LITTLE WHITE LIE

191

truly believe that Parson was actually a victim of identity theft.166
Additionally, the court heard testimony that the lead investigator told other
agents that he was looking at Parson in connection to a child pornography
case.167 This evidence, taken in whole, led the court to the conclusion that
the officer’s investigation of Parson had nothing to do with identity theft.168
Thus, the court classified the agent’s statements about investigating
identity theft as material misrepresentations, analogous to those presented in
Bumper.169 The agents presented themselves as focused solely on identity
theft, inducing Parson to place his trust in them under the impression that they
were there to help him.170 Parson’s age and physical condition made him a
particularly vulnerable target for identity theft, presenting an even greater
incentive for Parson to trust the officers to help him.171 Furthermore, the
officers never mentioned that they were there to investigate Parson for
possession of child pornography.172 In fact, after the officers found several
illegal images on Parson’s computer, they stated that they were not looking for
images of child pornography and that someone else was responsible for the
legality of those images.173 Based on these comments, the court surmised that
after being told that the officers were not looking for child pornography,
166. See id. (concluding that the officers did not believe Parson was the victim of
identity theft, nor did any evidence exist that he was); cf. Present and Future Fourth
Amendment, supra note 139, at 119–20 (examining pre-textual criminal stops made by
police officers).
167. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 596 (noting that the investigator told Pennsylvania
state troopers that he was investigating a child pornography case while making no mention
of credit card fraud).
168. See id. at 603 (“The evidence conclusively shows that the agents did not suspect
any identity theft in Parson’s situation.”).
169. See id. (noting that material misrepresentations, such as those made in the case sub
judice and in Bumper, are equivalent to physical coercion); see also CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 72 at § 3.10(c) (noting that when an extreme misrepresentation limits a suspect’s
ability to fairly assess the situation, consent is not valid).
170. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 603 (noting that the statements about identity theft
served to facilitate Parson’s trust in the officers).
171. See id. at 607−08 (noting that Parson’s heightened susceptibility to identity theft
left him in greater fear for the safety of his limited financial assets); see also Ralph V. Seep,
Annotation, What Constitutes Unusually “Vulnerable” Victim Under Sentencing Guideline
§ 3A1.1 Permitting Increase in Offense Level, 114 A.L.R. FED. 355, § 2 (1993) (outlining
enhanced sentencing guidelines as a means to provide greater protection to those particularly
vulnerable to crimes like identity theft).
172. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 603–04 (“Additionally, Agent Stitzel did not warn
Parson that he was a target, or that the agents were investigating the illegal possession of
child pornography.”).
173. See id. at 605 (noting that after officers found illegal images on Parson’s
computer, they still told Parson that they were not there to look for child pornography).
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“Parson could only assume that the men meant to aid him with his newly
realized identity theft problem.”174 Clearly, the statements made by the
officers were “deceptive and deliberately misleading.”175 As a result, the court
found that the “agents’ lies and trickery in this matter violated widely shared
social expectations.”176
Such lies serve to obliterate citizens’ widely shared social expectations
that they can trust government officials.177 If the court were to tolerate such
lies, it does not take much thought to envision the dire consequences this
would have on society.178 To avoid such consequences, the court properly
concluded that Parson’s consent to the search was invalid.179 The agents
greeted Parson with a lie.180 The record shows that the agents had no
indication that Parson was actually the victim of identity theft, nor was it their
primary purpose to search for evidence of identity theft.181 It is clear that the
agents only employed this ruse to gain Parson’s trust and consequent consent
to search. Parson’s current physical and mental state made him particularly
susceptible to this lie.182 The fact that Parson later rushed to his bank to
change his account numbers and safeguard other personal information is a
good indication that he truly believed what the agents had told him.183 The
agents never mentioned that they were looking for child pornography until
174. Id.
175. Id. at 604; see also United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 425 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting that when “the effect of the ruse is to convince the resident that he or she has no
choice but to invite the undercover officer in, the ruse may not pass constitutional muster”).
176. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 605.
177. See id. at 606 (“Lies such as this, if condoned, would obliterate citizens’ widely
shared social expectations that they may place some modicum of trust in the words of
government officials acting as such.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1913 n.24 (arguing
that lying is necessarily wrong because it promotes distrust).
178. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 606 (noting that the consequences of allowing law
enforcement officers to make material misrepresentations to citizens would be catastrophic).
179. See id. at 608 (concluding that the government had not met its burden of showing
that Parson’s consent was voluntary); cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968) (stating that the burden of proof rests on the government to prove that law
enforcement officers validly obtained a suspect’s consent to search).
180. See Parson,599 F.Supp. 2d at 603 (“The evidence conclusively shows that the
agents did not suspect any identity theft in Parson’s situation.”). “Additionally, no objective
evidence suggests any possibility of identity theft.” Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. (“[T]he facts of the encounter show that the agents’ statements about
identity theft were constantly on the mind of Parson . . . .”).
183. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 605 (noting that immediately after the agents left,
Parson went to his bank to change his account numbers and social security direct deposit
information).
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they actually found some on his computer.184 Even then the agents stated that
they were not there to look for pornographic images.185 It is the totality of
these factors that indicates that the agents’ statements were a material
misrepresentation. Although Parson thought he was consenting to a search for
evidence of identity theft, he was unknowingly giving the agents permission to
search for child pornography. Such consent clearly is not valid. The agents
never gave Parson any indication of what they were searching for and, as a
result, Parson never had the opportunity to weigh possible outcomes of his
consent.186 The court is absolutely correct in stating that if such police tactics
are allowed then society’s shared social expectations will be obliterated.187
Citizens must be able to trust their government, but this becomes impossible if
courts permit government agents to materially lie with impunity. As the court
states, the “absence of direct physical torture is not strong evidence supporting
voluntariness of consent.”188 Indeed, there are other equally as coercive, yet
far subtler, methods to gain consent.189 When faced with that dilemma here,
the court properly concluded that Parson’s consent to search was invalid.190
However, the court also turned to an analysis of the scope of Parson’s consent,
assuming, arguendo, that the consent was not invalid.191
184. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for
pornographic images).
185. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for
pornographic images). The court continued:
He asked the agents if he could get in trouble for having this type of picture.
The agents responded that they were not the ones who decided that, and that was
not what they were there to look for.
Id.
186. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for
pornographic images).
187. See id. (“The agents’ lies and trickery in this matter violated widely shared social
expectations.”).
188. Id.
189. See id. (stating that “the specter of identity theft added additional coercion and
intimidation to the situation”).
190. See id. at 607 (discussing Parson’s age, health issues, and financial stature). The
court continued:
Parson was sixty-five years old. His medical history includes frequent bouts
with depressive mood disorders, for which he has been medicated. He lived
alone, subsiding primarily on a low fixed income provided by the Social
Security Administration. His cataracts interfered greatly with his ability to see.
In short, Parson was a particularly vulnerable target for a ploy regarding identity
theft.
Id.
191. See id. at 609–10 (analyzing the scope of Parson’s consent to search).
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Alternatively, the court found that if Parson had validly consented to
the search, the agents subsequently exceeded the scope of that consent.192
This analysis was undoubtedly a means for the court to cover all angles of
the problem, while simultaneously publishing the messages that such police
tactics cannot be tolerated. The court properly looked to Jimeno for
guidance, stating that it must determine what an objective, reasonable
person would have understood the scope of the search to include.193 The
agents initially told Parson that they suspected that he was the victim of
identity theft.194 There was no initial talk of child pornography, and when
the subject came up later during the investigation, the agents explicitly
denied that they were there to investigate that issue.195 Thus the issue is
what a reasonable person would have ascertained the scope of his consent
to entail based on his exchange with the law enforcement officers.196 Here
Parson could only have consented to a search involving evidence of identity
theft. The officers explicitly stated that they were there to search for
identity theft; therefore there was no reasonable basis for Parson to think
that he was consenting to anything other than a search for evidence of
possible identity theft. When the officers searched Parson’s computer for
images of child pornography, a subject wholly unrelated to identity theft,
they clearly exceeded the scope of Parson’s consent.
Yet again, society’s expectations would be obliterated if officers
gained consent to search for one thing and then extended the scope of that
consent to all things. Citizens must be able to weigh their options when
192. See id. at 610 (concluding that officers exceeded the scope of Parson’s
hypothetical consent when they seized images of child pornography from his computer
because such images had no connection to credit card fraud); see also Donald L. Doernberg,
“Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of
Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV.
253, 298–99 (2006) (noting that a search by consent cannot exceed the limits imposed by the
consenting party).
193. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 609 (citing the objective reasonableness test
outlined in Jimeno as the proper mode of analysis for determining the scope of Parson’s
consent).
194. See id. (noting that the agents gained admission to Parson’s by telling him that
they suspected that he was a victim of identity theft).
195. See id. (noting that the agents clearly told Parson that they were not there to search
for child pornography).
196. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?” (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–89
(1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983))).
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granting consent, but this becomes impossible if officers can freely exceed
the scope of granted consent. The court recognized that problem here and
sought to address it through several modes of analysis.197 In cases with
facts similar to those in Parson, other courts must follow this analysis and
rule that the scope of consent has been exceeded in order to preserve the
sanctity of the Fourth Amendment. In the case at hand, weighing all the
evidence appropriately, the court correctly arrived at this conclusion.198
C. People v. Prinzing
In People v. Prinzing,199 the Illinois Appellate Court also faced the
issue of law enforcement trickery used to obtain a suspect’s consent to
search.200 Although the facts are similar to those of Parson, several
important differences are present in Prinzing that serve to distinguish its
slightly different holding. Like in Parson, local law enforcement officers
received information that led them to believe that Prinzing had purchased
child pornography on the Internet.201 One of the officers then called
Prinzing’s credit card company, which informed him that there had been a
disputed charge on an old credit card of Prinzing’s that he had since
canceled.202 The company told the officer that the fraudulent charge had
been reported around the time that the card was first used to purchase child
pornography.203 Officers then proceeded to go to Prinzing’s house, where
they told Prinzing that they were there to discuss “possible fraudulent
197. See generally, Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 602–12.
198. See id. at 610 (“When officers examined the seized computer for illegal child
pornography images, they violated the scope of any such consent, and thereby violated
Parson’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).
199. See People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that
suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted because the search
exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
200. See id. at 89 (stating that the defendant argued that his consent was illegally
obtained by deception and even if his consent was valid, the subsequent search exceeded the
scope of his consent).
201. See id. (noting that local law enforcement received information from a federal
agent that Prinzing may have purchased child pornography over the Internet).
202. See id. (noting that law enforcement officers contacted Prinzing’s credit card
company and obtained information about possible fraudulent charges on his credit card); see
also Bob Tedeschi, Retail Executives Are Uniting to Fight Credit-card Fraud in the Online
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at C6 (reporting that credit card fraud costs online
companies over $1 billion annually).
203. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 90 (noting that the reported fraudulent charge
occurred around the same time the credit card was used to purchase child pornography).
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charges made on his credit card.”204 Prinzing agreed to discuss the matter
and he provided the officers with his credit card information.205 One of the
officers then realized that the credit card number matched a card reported to
have been used to subscribe to “a particular Web site.”206 The officer asked
Prinzing for permission to search his computer in regard to the fraudulent
credit card charges, stating that if there was any evidence that his computer
had been compromised by unsafe Internet websites or viruses, it would
likely be on the computer used to make online purchases.207 Although
Prinzing denied having any suspicions that his computer had been
compromised, he nonetheless consented to its search by the officers.208 The
officer proceeded to search for pornographic images, not fraudulent credit
card charges.209 After about ten to fifteen minutes of searching, the officer
found several images of child pornography.210 This led to a more in depth
investigation, culminating in the confiscation of Prinzing’s home computers
and a taped statement by Prinzing.211 Prinzing ultimately moved to
suppress evidence found on his computer, but the trial court denied this
motion.212
Upon review, the Illinois Appellate Court properly began its analysis
with an examination of the voluntariness of Prinzing’s consent to search.213
The court began its discussion by considering the totality of the
204. See id. (noting that officers went to Prinzing’s house “under the guise of
interviewing him about ‘possible fraudulent charges made on his credit card’”).
205. See id. (noting that Prinzing agreed to discuss the possibility of fraudulent charges
on his credit card, and that he provided his credit card information to the officers); see also
United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990)) (noting that government agents cannot gain entry
into a suspect’s home by completely misrepresenting the scope of their search).
206. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 90.
207. See id. at 91 (noting that the officer told Prinzing that if there was evidence of an
unsafe virus, it might still be on the computer used to make online purchases).
208. See id. (noting that Prinzing consented to a search of his computer in regard to
fraudulent credit card activity).
209. See id. (noting that the officer only searched for pornographic images, not
evidence of credit card fraud); see also Present and Future Fourth Amendment, supra note
139, at 119 (examining the complexities of pretextual searches).
210. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that the officer found what he believed
were images of child pornography).
211. See id. at 94 (noting that an in-depth search led to the confiscation of Prinzing’s
computers and his subsequent agreement to provide a taped statement).
212. See id. (noting that the trial court denied Prinzing’s motion to suppress, concluding
that officers truly were searching for evidence of fraud first and foremost).
213. See id. at 96 (beginning with an examination of the voluntariness of Prinzing’s
consent).
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circumstances involved in Prinzing’s ultimate consent to search.214 The
analysis does not mention Prinzing’s age, race, educational background, or
However, in analyzing the
other such determinative factors.215
voluntariness of Prinzing’s consent, one can probably assume that Prinzing
was a man of average age and intelligence because the court does not note
otherwise.216 In the analysis of Prinzing’s consent, the main issue was
whether or not the officers engaged in deceit or trickery that manifestly
affected Prinzing’s ability to voluntarily consent to a search of his
computer.217 Here it is important to note that the officers admitted that they
had no actual information that Prinzing’s credit card had been used
fraudulently nor did they ever mention the words “child pornography” in
their discussions with Prinzing.218 Additionally, the officers never informed
Prinzing that his credit card might have been used to purchase child
pornography.219 However, the appellate court determined that it was
undisputed that the officers had legitimate information regarding disputed
credit card charges that took place around the same time that child
pornography website charges were incurred.220 Thus the court concluded
that the police officers had not fully resolved whether or not the disputed
214. See id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)) (noting that
an examination of the totality of the circumstances is the best place to begin).
215. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that these
factors are relevant, but not decisive, in evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent).
216. The failure to mention any unique or differentiating characteristics of Prinzing
supports an inference that he was of average age, intelligence, etc. Cf. United States v.
Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 607 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (detailing Parson’s unique personal
characteristics, leading to the conclusion that he was more susceptible to outside influence
than the average person).
217. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 96 (“This leaves us to first determine whether the trial
court’s factual determination that Detective Smith did not engage in trickery, deceit, or
subterfuge when he asked to search defendant’s computer . . . is against the manifest weight
of the evidence.”).
218. See id. at 93 (noting that officers had no information that Prinzing’s card had
actually been used fraudulently and that they never mentioned that they were also
investigating child pornography).
219. See id. (noting that the officers did not tell Prinzing that his credit card may have
been used to purchase child pornography); see also Jason E. Zakai, You Say Yes, But Can I
Say No?: The Future of Third-Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s paradigm for the consent
search doctrine has become less focused on the subjective test of the defendant’s
voluntariness and more concerned with the objective test of whether the officer compelled
the defendant’s consent.”).
220. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (noting that the child pornography charges were
incurred around the same time that disputed charges took place on Prinzing’s credit card).
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charges were related to the child pornography website charges.221 As a
result, the police officers did not make any manifest misrepresentations
when they told Prinzing that they were investigating fraudulent credit card
charges.222 Therefore, the court concluded that Prinzing’s consent to search
was voluntary.223
Several distinct problems arise with this conclusion, particularly
surrounding the fairness of its application.224 The court stated that the
officers were “not required to provide [the] defendant with every piece of
information that [they] possessed while investigating the matter.”225
Although this may be true, credit card fraud was clearly not the main reason
for the officers’ visit to Prinzing’s house—it was the information they had
received from federal agents about possible child pornography charges on
Prinzing’s credit card.226 Furthermore, the officers that investigated
Prinzing were specifically assigned to review cases that involve Internet
child pornography, not credit card fraud.227 Additionally, the federal agent
never mentioned credit card fraud to the investigating officers nor was there
any information that suggested that someone other than Prinzing had used
the credit card to visit the child pornography sites.228 Finally, the officer
221. See id. at 97−98 (“[T]he police had not resolved whether the disputed credit card
charge was related to the child pornography Web site charges.”).
222. See id. at 98 (noting that the police did not make any blatant misrepresentations
since the credit card fraud issue was not fully resolved); cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a patent misrepresentation made by law enforcement
officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s consent to search rendered the following search
unconstitutional).
223. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (concluding that Prinzing voluntarily consented to
the search of his computer).
224. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (noting that great significance
should be placed on widely shared societal expectations of fairness in assessing a suspect’s
consent).
225. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97.
226. See id. at 89–90 (noting that the officers’ investigation of Prinzing only began after
they received information from federal agents that Prinzing may have purchased child
pornography on the Internet); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1461 (1996) (noting the idea
that the guilty seem perhaps less deserving of a right to privacy which they have abused).
227. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 92 (noting that the officers involved in the
investigation were assigned to handle Internet child pornography cases, indicating that they
really were not concerned about potential credit card fraud).
228. See id. (noting that there was no legitimate indication that anyone other than
Prinzing had used the credit card to purchase child pornography on the Internet, thus
virtually eliminating the potential for credit card fraud); see also Tracey Maclin, The Good
and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 27
(2008) (“[W]hether a person’s consent is voluntary simply depends on all of the facts of the
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who conducted the search of Prinzing’s computer began with a scan to
search for images associated with previously visited websites.229 The
officer insisted that he was only looking for images of the Visa logo, not
child pornography.230 Clearly this is tenuous at best. Here the evidence
clearly tends to show that the officers had no intention of actually
investigating Prinzing’s computer for signs of credit card fraud. Instead
their real purpose was to search Prinzing’s computer for images of child
pornography based on a tip they had received from federal agents.231
Yet the court ultimately concluded that the officers had a “twofold
purpose” for their visit to Prinzing’s house.232 However, this notion of a
“twofold purpose” is extremely problematic. Under this conclusion,
officers can use even the most tenuous hypothetical scenarios to mask their
true intentions for wanting to search a suspect’s property. Such a
conclusion opens the door to massive police abuse, in turn creating an
environment that inherently undermines the trust that citizens place in law
enforcement officers.233 It suddenly becomes impossible for a citizen to
determine the reason officers wish to search his property. How can
someone grant voluntary consent in a scenario in which he does not truly
know what he is consenting to? Here, Prinzing consented to a search of his
computer under the belief that officers were searching for evidence of credit
card fraud, not child pornography.234 Yet this was not the case, as the
officers took advantage of the situation to gain access to Prinzing’s
computer.235 Thus, the court’s conclusion that Prinzing voluntarily gave
consent is highly questionable.

case.”).
229. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that officer began the computer search with
an image scan for Internet images).
230. See id. (noting that the officer was looking for images of the Visa logo, not child
pornography).
231. See id. at 90 (stating that one of the investigating officers received a tip from an
ICE agent that the Defendant’s credit card had been used to purchase child pornography and
that this tip prompted the officer to begin investigating the Defendant).
232. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (noting that the officers had “the twofold purpose”
of looking for both credit card fraud and child pornography).
233. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1913 n.24 (stating that lying promotes distrust).
234. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that the officers told Prinzing that they
were investigating potential credit card fraud).
235. See id. at 91 (noting that the officers asked to search the defendant’s computer
with the stated intent to determine how credit card information may have been stolen).
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The court does ultimately arrive at the overall proper conclusion after
an examination of the scope of Prinzing’s consent.236After an examination
of the facts, the court determined that the officers’ search exceeded the
scope of Prinzing’s consent.237 As a result, the court concluded that a
suppression of the evidence was warranted.238 The court stated that the
officer, “by his own words, limited the scope of the intended computer
search.”239 The officer specifically requested to search Prinzing’s computer
for viruses or other such programs to determine whether or not Prinzing’s
credit card information had been stolen.240 During their interactions with
Prinzing, the officers made no mention of child pornography or the fact that
his credit card may have been used to purchase child pornography.241 Thus,
based on the exchange between the officers and Prinzing, the court
determined that the officers limited the scope of their search to evidence
pertaining to credit card fraud.242 As a result, any image search conducted
on the computer exceeded the scope of Prinzing’s consent because no
image could lead the officers to discover evidence of a virus or other
programs that could steal Prinzing’s credit card information as such
programs would not be embedded in an image file.243 Because Prinzing
consented to a search for evidence of credit card fraud, the scope was
limited only to file areas in which such evidence might exist.244 The only
236. See id. at 99−100 (finding that the officer’s search of the defendant’s computer
exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent).
237. See id. (determining that the officers exceeded the scope of the defendant’s
consent).
238. See id. (“We accordingly conclude that suppression was warranted.”).
239. Id.; see also United States v. Benezario, 339 F.Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.P.R. 2004)
(“A search conducted pursuant to consent may not exceed the scope of the consent sought
and given.” (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991))).
240. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (noting that the officer only stated that he wished
to search Prinzing’s computer for evidence of credit card fraud).
241. See id. at 93 (noting that the officers did not tell Prinzing that his credit card may
have been used to purchase child pornography). But see Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device For Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1983)
(noting that there is no implicit Fourth Amendment right to be secure from the government
finding evidence of a crime).
242. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (“Detective Smith’s search exceeded the scope of
defendant’s consent.”).
243. See id. (noting that programs which could steal credit card information would not
exist in image files, thus making a search of such images beyond the scope of Prinzing’s
consent).
244. See id. at 99 (“Defendant consented to a search only for viruses, not images.”); see
also Benezario, 339 F.Supp. 2d at 367 (“A search conducted pursuant to consent may not
exceed the scope of the consent sought and given.” (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248
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way for the officers to obtain evidence of child pornography on Prinzing’s
computer was to search image files, thus exceeding the scope of Prinzing’s
consent.245 Ultimately, the court did arrive at the proper conclusion by
determining that the images obtained from the search conducted of
Prinzing’s computer were beyond the scope of his consent, therefore
making the search illegal.246
Hence, the court upheld the officers’ clear use of subterfuge to gain
Prinzing’s consent to search his computer, but they drastically limited the
scope of the search based on the exchange between Prinzing and the
officers.247 Ultimately, the court arrived at the correct conclusion, but not
before opening the door for massive police abuses. It is fairly clear that the
police had no real intention to search for credit card fraud.248 They were
simply using this as a ruse to gain access to image files on Prinzing’s
computer.249 Yet, the court upheld the validity of this ruse.250 They
allowed the officers to gain access to Prinzing’s computer via a lie, but then
they severely restricted the scope of the search to the areas of the computer
related to that initial lie. Why not just conclude that the consent was invalid
because it was not voluntarily given?
Although non-material misrepresentation is not always a deciding
factor by itself in determining the validity of consent, it still plays a critical
role.251 The court in Parson recognized this and correctly ruled that
Parson’s consent was involuntary because the officers lied to him.252
Although here, in Prinzing, there was actually a contested credit card
(1991))).
245. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (noting that programs which could steal credit
card information would not exist in image files, thus making a search of such images beyond
the scope of Prinzing’s consent).
246. See id. (concluding that suppression was warranted because the search exceeded
the scope of Prinzing’s consent since evidence of credit card fraud would not exist in image
files).
247. See id. at 99 (examining the verbal exchange between Prinzing and the officers).
248. See id. at 90 (noting that the investigation of Prinzing began with the tip from the
ICE agent about child pornography).
249. See id. at 97 (noting that the officers did not mention child pornography to the
defendant).
250. See id. (noting that the officers did not necessarily lie because they had yet not
fully resolved what the disputed credit card charge was).
251. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (noting that
voluntariness of consent should be determined from a totality of the circumstances, not
simply one factor).
252. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that
the officers explicitly told Parson that they were not there to investigate child pornography).
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charge involved.253 Nevertheless, the overall relation of this to the police
officers’ investigation was clearly erroneous. In fact, its only relation was
that it occurred at roughly the same time that charges were made on a child
pornography website.254 This relation is far too tenuous to justify the
court’s determination. In essence, Prinzing consented to a lie and a court
should not hold that such consent is valid. In doing so, the court gave
government agents far too much latitude to use deception in obtaining
consents to search. This is exactly what prior courts sought to stop in an
effort to preserve citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections.255 The court in
Prinzing is correct in determining that police officers do not have to give a
suspect every piece of information they have while investigating a
matter.256 However, courts should not extend this concept to the extent that
the court did in Prinzing.257 The police withheld not only the main reason
for their investigation of Prinzing, but essentially the only reason.258 Where
do we draw the line?
III. Potential Application of the Plain View Doctrine
The Richardson court was the only one to directly address the
potential application of the plain view doctrine to the present facts, but each
of the previous three cases merit a brief discussion of the possible
application of the plain view doctrine.259 In Richardson, the court
specifically stated that a plain view argument for the discovery of the
pornographic images fails because such images fell outside the scope of the

253. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (noting that there was a disputed credit card
charge).
254. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (noting that the disputed credit card charge
occurred around the same time that the charge was made to a child pornography website,
providing a loose basis for a credit card fraud theory).
255. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a patent
misrepresentation made by law enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s
consent to search rendered the following search unconstitutional).
256. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (stating that the investigating officer “was not
required to provide defendant with every piece of information that he possessed by
investigating the matter”).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 99 (noting that the subject of the exchange between the defendant and
the officer was limited only to potential credit card fraud).
259. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 716 (beginning an analysis of the facts under
the plain view doctrine).
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search for illegal credit card activity.260 The image files were not in any of
the officers’ plain view, as shown by the fact that the officers had to open
the files to view the images contained therein.261 The opening of these files
took the officers beyond the scope of the consented search to areas of the
computer in which they did not have lawful access.262 As discussed
previously, the scope of Richardson’s consent limited the officers to
investigate only the areas of the computer where evidence could be found
of some sort of credit card fraud.263 Without getting too far into the subject
regarding the complicated technical nature of computers and all the privacy
issues that accompany it, it is sufficient to say that evidence of online credit
card fraud would not exist in image files.264 The contents of such image
files were not in plain view on the computer; the officers should have been
looking in other file areas of the computer for evidence of Internet fraud.265
The analysis might be very different if Richardson had open images of child
pornography on his computer when the officers began their search. Such
images would then appear in plain view to anyone who had access to the
computer, regardless of how limited that access might have been. In that
case, such images might fall under the plain view exception; however, that
was not the case.
Nor was this the case in Parson and Prinzing.266 Although the courts
in neither of these cases engaged in a discussion of the applicability of the
plain view doctrine to the facts of the cases, it is fairly clear that such an
application would be unwarranted.267 In both cases, the images were
260. See id. (“A ‘plain view’ argument for discovery of the child pornography also fails
because the consented search was limited to a concern for the ‘[illegal] credit card activity
over the Internet,’ not images.”).
261. See id. (noting that the closed image files were outside of the plain view of the
officers).
262. See id. (stating that the officers proceeded to open image files that they were not
permitted by the scope of Richardson’s consent to be viewing); see also United States v.
Maldonado Garcia, 655 F.Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.P.R. 1987) (noting that the scope of a
consent search must conform to precise limits).
263. See supra Part II.A (examining the Richardson case).
264. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 715 (quoting EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME 279 (2d ed. 2004)) (describing the manner in which a
computer stores and logs Internet activity).
265. See id. at 716 (noting that the images were beyond the plain view of the officers).
266. See generally United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009);
People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
267. See e.g., Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 716 (“A ‘plain view’ argument for
discovery of the child pornography also fails because the consented search was limited to a
concern for the ‘[illegal] credit card activity over the Internet,’ not images.”).
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contained in image files that fell beyond the scope of the consented search
and it does not appear from the facts that any of these images were open in
plain view.268 The opening of these image files took the officers beyond the
scope of their permissible search into areas of the computer in which they
did not have consent to enter. As such, a plain view argument also fails in
Prinzing and Parson for essentially the same reasons that it failed in
Richardson; none of the pornographic images seized in these three cases
successfully falls under the plain view doctrine.
IV. Suggested Rule to Provide Clearer Guidance
When law enforcement officers, acting as fully disclosed officers of
the law, request consent to search from a suspect, they must fully disclose
the main purpose of their visit in order for any subsequently rendered
consent to be valid.
These cases offer three different fact scenarios that are similar in
some respects, yet decidedly different in others.269 In each case, the
police gained access to the suspects’ personal property through the use
of subterfuge.270 Each ruse was slightly different from the others, but
the overall impact was roughly the same.271 In each instance, the
police gained access to the suspects’ property under the guise of
providing aid rather than investigating a potential crime.272 It proved
to be highly successful from a crime-fighting standpoint; in each
instance the officers found numerous images of illegal child
pornography.273 It was a failure in other respects as each of the
defendants’ suppression motions were granted, thus leaving the law
enforcement officers back where they started—with nothing.274 In
each of the cases, it was the officers’ own words that ultimately
provided an unintended limitation on the scope of their searches,
268. See generally United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009);
People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
269. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694; Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592; Prinzing, 907
N.E. 2d 87.
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because the courts used the scope of the defendants’ consent to limit
the searches.275 In only one case did a court actually determine that the
Although Parson’s personal
consent itself was invalid.276
characteristics seemed to be a controlling factor in the district court’s
decision, the other factors present in Parson were very similar to those
of Prinzing and Richardson.277 In each case, the courts ultimately
arrived at the constitutionally correct decision.278 It is clear, both from
the facts and holdings of each case, that a unified, guiding standard is
necessary. Such a standard would not only serve as a protective device
for citizens’ constitutional rights, but it would also provide clearer
guidance for law enforcement officers so that they can be more
effective in their pursuit of crime.
Finding such a standard is no easy task. As the Court in Lewis
noted, a per se rule banning the use of deception by undercover police
officers would unduly hamper law enforcement officers in their pursuit
of crime.279 However, the Court’s decision in that case was focused on
the specific area of undercover officers, not police officers in
general.280 Furthermore, the Court was reluctant to establish an
outright prohibition on the use of deception, but they did not address
the possibility of creating a rule outlining the permissible use of
deception without completely prohibiting such deception281 The three
cases discussed in this paper differ from Lewis in that none of the
officers involved were working undercover.282 They all arrived at the
suspects’ homes dressed in some sort of police garb and they all
immediately identified themselves as officers of the law.283 In fact,
275. Id.
276. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 608–09 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(concluding that Parson’s consent to the search was invalid).
277. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
278. Id.
279. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (stating that a per se rule
about the use of deception by undercover agents would unduly hamper law enforcement
officers in the pursuit of crime).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
283. Id.
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this was essential to their ruse, since they wanted the suspects to
believe that they were there to investigate legitimate identity threats to
the suspects.284 Their position as police officers added credibility to
their story and allowed them to convince the suspects that they were
there to help.285 This is a decidedly different scenario from that of
undercover police work, which could be the subject for an entirely
different legal discussion.
Although difficult, it is not impossible to formulate a workable
rule to address police conduct in scenarios similar to that of three cases
discussed above. However, such a rule cannot, and should not, be
applied broadly across the entire spectrum of police work. As
mentioned above, undercover police work is very different from the
type of work the police officers were conducting in the above cases.
This rule is therefore only applicable to scenarios in which police
officers are operating as fully disclosed officers of the law while
requesting access to a suspect’s personal property. When operating as
such, police officers must fully inform the suspect of the main purpose
of their visit in order to validly obtain any consent to search.286 This
proposed rule is simple in theory, but it requires a fact intensive
analysis. The main purpose of the officers’ visit to a citizen’s home
should be determined from a wide variety of objectively reviewed
factors, including: the nature of the officer’s primary assignments and
the nature of the evidence previously collected by the officer in
connection to the suspect.287 Such a rule would prevent officers who
were assigned primarily to child pornography cases from using the
remote and unsubstantiated possibility that a suspect has been the
victim of identity theft as a means to gain that suspect’s consent to a
search. At its core, the use of such tactics essentially induces the
suspect to consent to a lie under the reasonable, yet incorrect,
assumption that the officers are there to help. This rule eliminates that
possibility, requiring the police to state the real purpose of their visit
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See Michael J. Friedman, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The Problem of Limited
Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 313, 344 (1998)
(noting that any rule which focuses on the subjective intent of police officers is easy to
manipulate and difficult to enforce).
287. See David John Housholder, Note, Reconciling Consent Searches and Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence: Incorporating Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent Searches,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1279, 1294 (2005) (noting that many court decisions show a tendency to
favor objective standards).
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or actually produce legitimate evidence of an alternate reason for their
visit.
The rule provides a clearly delineated guideline that can serve as a
protective device to ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of
citizens are not violated by the police. Without such a rule, these
rights could easily erode in the face of illegitimate police tactics. A
clear guideline, such as this rule, would solidify and preserve the
Fourth Amendment rights that our forefathers valued so dearly.288 The
construction of this rule serves to deter uniformed officers from
abusing their position of trust by advancing a lie in order to gain a
suspect’s consent to search. The requirement that officers disclose the
main purpose of their visit is the key element that creates the
restriction necessary to protect citizens from unlawful and
unconstitutional searches and seizures in the specific scenario
described above. With this rule in place, suspects will actually know
what they are consenting to, thus preserving their Fourth Amendment
rights as citizens. But this rule only applies when government agents
are acting as fully disclosed officers of the law. In this way, the rule
will not hamper police officers engaged in legitimate undercover work.
Therefore the rule does not infringe upon this important, legally
sanctioned area of police work.
Furthermore, this rule can have an overall beneficial effect for law
enforcement officers as well. If officers adhere to the rule, any
evidence they collect will be admissible, in turn allowing prosecutors
to move forward with their case.289 As a result, there can be more
successful prosecutions of legitimate criminals. In the cases described
above, each of the suspects clearly violated the law,290 but each suspect
ultimately escaped punishment because the police violated their
constitutional rights.291 This rule has the potential to stop scenarios
like this by providing police officers with a guideline that allows them
288. See William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule:
Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1036–37 (1994) (chronicling the rise of Fourth Amendment principles
in colonial America beginning in 1776).
289. See e.g., Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that the state bears the burden of proving that evidence was properly gathered, and therefore
admissible at trial).
290. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
291. Id.

208

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 167 (2011)

to pursue criminals in a manner that is consistent with the U.S.
Constitution.
Police officers undoubtedly have a difficult and
frustrating job, but this rule could ease some of these frustrations by
providing officers with a guideline for gathering evidence in a manner
that will not later render such evidence inadmissible. Admittedly,
officers might initially feel frustrated that they must adhere to a strict
guideline while gathering evidence. But, in the end, it will be far less
frustrating than watching legitimate criminals go unpunished.
Ultimately, this rule could allow government officers to have greater
success in identifying and prosecuting the crimes that undermine the
safety of an ordered society.
Consequently, this rule has potential benefits for both citizens and
police officers. Citizens can place their trust in police officers,
knowing that their constitutionally guaranteed protections are still
valid, while the officers have greater guidance in successfully
obtaining evidence. By obtaining success in both of these areas,
harmony can be reached between the rights of citizens and the duty of
police officers to pursue and extinguish criminal activity.
The three cases discussed above292 undoubtedly present a difficult
scenario for courts to analyze. On the one hand, courts must balance
the Fourth Amendment rights afforded to all citizens. On the other,
courts must balance the ever-pressing need to successfully pursue and
eliminate crime. Both factors are essential to modern society. The
courts in the above cases wrestled with these competing interests,
ultimately arriving at proper conclusions.293 But the analysis was not
perfect, nor was it clearly guided by a useful rule.294 When law
enforcement officers, acting as fully disclosed officers of the law,
request consent to search from a suspect, they must fully disclose the
main purpose of their visit in order for any subsequently rendered
consent to be valid. A rule, such as this one, could provide greater
guidance for both courts and law enforcement officers, while
292. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 724–25 (granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the defendant’s computer because
the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 612
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during search of the defendant’s
computer because defendant’s consent to search was invalid); Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100
(concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted
because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
293. Id.
294. Id.
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simultaneously protecting the rights of citizens, no matter what their
accused crime. It is a difficult subject area, but answers must be
found. Such answers could serve to benefit both citizens and police
officers alike, fostering an environment that is beneficial to all.
V. Conclusion
Justice Cardozo once lamented the idea that a “criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.”295 Such is the scenario in the three
cases discussed above.296 It is certainly lamentable that suspects in
possession of child pornography are able to suppress its evidence due to the
over-extension of the police search.297 There is, at some point, a basic
notion that justice is not served by allowing such criminals to escape
punishment for these crimes, but there is the equally compelling need for
citizens to safely place their trust in the officers of the law. In the cases at
hand, police officers used surreptitious methods to identify and apprehend
criminals.298 Although they made no attempt to hide who they were, they
still made an effort to shield their true intentions in an attempt to deceive
the citizens to whom they were speaking.299 The officers used their position
of trust as a means to implement deceptive action. By allowing such action
to go unchecked, courts serve to undermine the fundamental protections of
the Fourth Amendment.300 Citizens must be able to trust their government
295. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
296. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 724–25 (granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the defendant’s computer because
the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 612
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during search of the defendant’s
computer because defendant’s consent to search was invalid); Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100
(concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted
because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
297. See Derrick Augustus Carter, To Catch the Lion, Tether the Goat: Entrapment,
Conspiracy, and Sentencing Manipulation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 135, 138 (2009) (noting that
there is little common sympathy for a criminal suspect who is willing to commit a crime).
298. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008);
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
299. Id.
300. See Mary Helen Wimberly, Rethinking the Substantive Due Process Right to
Privacy: Grounding Privacy in the Fourth Amendment, 60 VAND. L. REV. 283, 312 (2007)
(“[W]hen it comes to protecting rights guaranteed by the Constitution, courts have
traditionally taken on the role as protector. Therefore, a court, in recognizing a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, would be fulfilling its traditional role.”).
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and its officials. The absence of such trust has the potential to cause more
damage than affording the full array of Fourth Amendment rights to
suspected criminals. The courts in the three cases above struggled to
address this issue and ultimately reached the correct conclusion, preserving
what is left of the Fourth Amendment.301 However, clearer guidance is
undoubtedly needed in order to guarantee correct results in the future.
Continuing forward without such guidance is not only ill-advised, but also
invidious to the fundamental principles upon which our government is
founded.302 “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.”303

301. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 724–25 (granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the defendant’s computer because
the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 612
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during search of the defendant’s
computer because defendant’s consent to search was invalid); Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100
(concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted
because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent).
302. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
303. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

